EasySMS: a protocol for end to end secure transmission of SMS by Saxena, N. & Chaudhari, N. S.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/138463/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Saxena, N. and Chaudhari, N. S. 2014. EasySMS: a protocol for end to end secure transmission of





Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications







Abstract—Nowadays, Short Message Service is being used in 
many daily life applications including healthcare monitoring, 
mobile banking, mobile commerce etc. But when we send an SMS 
from one mobile phone to another, the information contained in 
the SMS transmit as plain text. Sometimes this information may 
be confidential like account numbers, passwords, license 
numbers etc., and it is a major drawback to send such 
information through SMS while the traditional SMS service does 
not provide encryption to the information before its transmission. 
In this paper, we proposed an efficient and secure protocol called 
EasySMS which provides end-to-end secure communication 
through SMS between end users. The working of the protocol is 
presented by considering two different scenarios. The analysis of 
the proposed protocol shows that this protocol is able to prevent 
various attacks including SMS disclosure, over the air 
modification, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and 
impersonation attack. The EasySMS protocol generates 
minimum communication and computation overheads as 
compare to existing SMSSec and PK-SIM protocols. On an 
average, the EasySMS protocol reduces 51% and 31% of the 
bandwidth consumption and reduces 62% and 45% of message 
exchanged during the authentication process as compare to 
SMSSec and PK-SIM protocols respectively. Authors claim that 
EasySMS is the first protocol completely based on the symmetric 
key cryptography and retain original architecture of cellular 
network.  
 
Index Terms— authentication, over-the-air, security, SMS, 
symmetric key  
I. INTRODUCTION 
OWADAYS Short Message Service (SMS) has become 
one of the fastest and strong communication     channels 
to transmit the information across the worldwide. On 
December 3, 2013, SMS service has completed its 21 years as 
on December 3, 1992, the world’s first SMS was sent by Neil 
Papworth from the UK through the Vodafone network [1]. 
The SMS are used in many real world applications as a 
communication medium such as in Transportation Information 
System [2], MobileDeck [3], SMSAssassin [4], SMS-based 
web search such as SMSFind [5], Monitoring Community 
Health Worker Performance [6], private health facilities using 
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SMS [7], participation in elections through SMS [8], in Crime 
Scene Investigation [9] and many more. 
A. Research Problem 
Sometimes, we send the confidential information like 
password, pass code, banking details and private identity to 
our friends, family members and service providers through an 
SMS. But the traditional SMS service offered by various 
mobile operators surprisingly does not provide information 
security of the message being sent over the network. In order 
to protect such confidential information, it is strongly required 
to provide end-to-end secure communication between end 
users. SMS usage is threatened with security concerns, such as 
SMS disclosure [10], man-in-the-middle attack [11], replay 
attack [12] and impersonation attack [13]. There are some 
more issues related to the open functionality of SMS which 
can incapacitate all voice communications in a metropolitan 
area [14], and SMS-based mobile botelnet [15] as Android 
botnet [16]. SMS messages are transmitted as plaintext 
between mobile user (MS) and the SMS center (SMSC), using 
wireless network. SMS contents are stored in the systems of 
network operators and can be read by their personnel. 
B. Key Contribution 
The above requirements can be accomplished by proposing 
a protocol called EasySMS which provides end-to-end 
security during the transmission of SMS over the network. 
The EasySMS protocol prevents the SMS information from 
various attacks including SMS disclosure, over the air (OTA) 
modification, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and 
impersonation attack. This EasySMS sends lesser number of 
transmitted bits, generates less computation overhead, and 
reduces bandwidth consumption and message exchanged as 
compare to SMSSec [17] and PK-SIM [18] protocols. 
C. Organization 
This paper has organized into VII sections. Section II 
presents literature review of the work done related to SMS 
security. In section III, a new protocol is proposed which 
provides end-to-end secure transmission of SMS in cellular 
networks. Section IV illustrates the analysis of proposed 
protocol. Section V, discusses suitable symmetric algorithm 
for EasySMS protocol. Section VI presents formal proof of 
EasySMS protocol. Finally, section VII summarizes 
conclusion of the work. 
EasySMS: A Protocol for End-to-End Secure 
Transmission of SMS 







II. RELATED WORK 
Previously, various authors have proposed different 
techniques to provide security to the transmitted messages. An 
implementation of a public key cryptosystem for SMS in a 
mobile phone network has been presented in [19] but the 
security analysis of the protocol has not discussed. A secure 
SMS is considered to provide mobile commerce services in 
[20] and is based on public key infrastructure. A framework 
Secure Extensible and Efficient SMS (SEESMS) is presented 
in [21] which allows two peers to exchange encrypted 
communication between peers by using public key 
cryptography. Another new application layer framework 
called SSMS is introduced in [22] to efficiently embed the 
desired security attributes in SMS to be used as a secure bearer 
for m-payment systems and solution is based on the elliptic 
curve-based public key that uses public keys for the secret key 
establishment. An efficient framework for automated 
acquisition and storage of medical data using the SMS based 
infrastructure is presented in [23] and the results conclude that 
the proposed SMS based framework provides a low-
bandwidth, reliable, efficient and cost effective solution for 
medical data acquisition. The [20] and [22] generate shared 
key for each session but also generate huge overheads and not 
suitable for the real world applications. In all [19], [20], [21], 
[22] and [23], it is not clear whether the proposed approaches 
are able to prevent SMS against various attacks. All the above 
mentioned approaches/ protocols/ frameworks generate a large 
overhead as they propose an additional framework for the 
security of SMS. Due to physical limitations of the mobile 
phones, it is recommended to develop a protocol which would 
make minimum use of computing resources and would 
provide better security. However, implementation of 
framework always increases the overall overhead which is not 
much suitable for the resource constraints devices such as 
mobile phones. Thus, in this paper we compared our proposed 
protocol with the existing SMSSec and PK-SIM protocols.  
The reason for chosen these protocols for comparison is that 
these are the only existing protocols which do not propose to 
change the existing architecture of cellular networks. We 
wanted to compare our proposed protocol with some existing 
protocols devoted to provide end-to-end SMS security with 
symmetric key cryptography, but there is no such protocol 
exists. Both protocols are having two phases similar to the 
proposed protocol and are based on symmetric as well as 
asymmetric key cryptography while the proposed protocol is 
completely based on symmetric key cryptography. The 
SMSSec protocol can be used to secure an SMS 
communication sent by Java’s Wireless Messaging API while 
the PK-SIM protocol proposes a standard SIM card with 
additional PKI functionality. Both protocols are based on 
client-server paradigm, i.e., one side is mobile user and the 
other side is authentication server but they do not present any 
scenario where an SMS is sent from one mobile user to 
another mobile user. The SMSSec protocol does not illustrate 
the security analysis. 
III. SECURITY GOALS & PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This section focuses on the attack model, system and 
communication model, basic assumption and detail description 
of proposed protocol. Table I represents definition of various 
symbols used in the paper with their sizes, while Table II lists 
various functions used in the paper with their definitions. 
A. Attack Model 
An attack model describes different scenarios for the 
possibilities of various attacks where a malicious MS can 
access the authentic information, or misguide the legitimate 
MS. Since, the SMS is sent as plaintext, thus network 
operators can easily access the content of SMS during the 
transmission at SMSC. This leads to SMS disclosure attack. In 
traditional cellular network, the OTA interface between the 
MS and the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) is protected by a 
weak encryption algorithm (such as A5/1 or A5/2), thus an 
attacker can compromise these algorithms to capture the 
information contained in the SMS or can alter the SMS 
information. The attacker can also try to cryptanalyze the 
generated cryptographic keys used in the authentication 
protocol. The attacker may fraudulently delay the conversation 
between both MS and can capture or reuse the authenticated 
information (during the protocol execution) contain in 
previous messages which results in the form of replay attack. 
Later, the attacker may send the captured information to the 
TABLE I 
ABBREVIATION AND SYMBOLS  
Symbol Definition Bits 
MS Mobile Station referring user       _ 
AS Authentication Server referring AuC        _ 
CA/RA Certification/Registration Authority       _ 
IDMS International Mobile Subscriber Identity of 
MS 
  128 
Q/Qn New Session Identifier     28 
Rc/Nc/Ns/Na Random Number                                                    128    
Pf Private Port Number     16 
ReqNo Request Number                                                         8 
SK/SK_MS Symmetric key shared b/w MS and AS   128   
DK1 Delegation key   256 
MAC/H Message Authentication Code/Hash     64 
Ti Timestamp     64 
CertSAG Certificate of Security Access Gateway      40 






Symmetric key shared b/w AS1 and AS2  
Sequence Number 
Public  key of Server 
Primary key 
Expiry Time 
  128 
    28 
  128 
  128 
    64 
 TABLE II 
DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONS USED 
Symbol Definition  
f1 Message authentication code function  
f2 Key generation function for DK1   
{}SK_AS-CA Encryption function with SK_AS-CA key  
{}SK_AS1-AS2 Encryption function with SK_AS1-AS2 key  
{}DK1 Encryption function with DK1 key  
{}SK_MS2 Function with symmetric key of MS2 shared 
b/w MS2 and AS/AS2                                            
 
|| Concatenation  







server or can modify the sequence of messages for getting the 
authentication token. An attacker can also perform a man-in-
the-middle attack when an MS is connected to a BTS through 
wireless network and eavesdrops the session initiated by 
legitimate MS. The attacker establishes an independent 
connection with both the victim’s MS. It performs 
eavesdropping on the active connection, modifies and 
intercepts the messages. However, the intruder must intercept 
the transmitted message between two victim MS and inject 
false information, which is straightforward in the 
circumstances where communication is done in an 
unencrypted or weak encryption network. But all is possible 
when an attacker gets the secret key or some information 
based on which he/she could guess the secret key. Normally, 
this attack executes during the key exchange phase of the 
protocol and tries to capture the session key. It may happen 
that the intruder could impersonate the MS or the AS, if the 
proper integrity is not maintained over the network. The 
intruder can pretend like a legitimate MS and ask to the AS for 
valid authentication tokens in order to make the AS believe 
that originate from the authentic MS. Similarly, he/she can 
also show him(her)self like a valid AS and ask legitimate MS 
to send the information in order to make the target MS believe 
that originate from a genuine AS.  
B. System and Communication Model 
In order to overcome the above stated attacks, various 
cipher algorithms are implemented with the proposed 
authentication protocol. We recommend that the cipher 
algorithms should be stored on to the SIM (part of MS) as well 
as in the AS. Since providing security needs to do some extra 
effort which is measured in terms of cost, thus providing or 
adding extra security means increasing more cost. Authors 
propose to include one more service as ‘Secure Message’ in 
the menu of mobile software developed by various mobile 
companies as shown in Fig. 1. Mobile operators can add some 
extra charges to send secure message by their customers over 
the networks. Whenever a user wants to send a secure message 
to other user, the proposed protocol namely EasySMS is 
executed which makes available the symmetric shared key 
between both MS and then ciphering of message takes place 
using a symmetric key algorithm. 
C. Proposed Protocol: EasySMS 
In this section, we propose a new protocol named EasySMS 
with two different scenarios which provide end-to-end secure 
transmission of information in the cellular networks. First 
scenario is illustrated in Fig. 2 where both MS belong to the 
same AS, in other words share the same Home Location 
Register (HLR) while the second scenario is presented in Fig. 
3 where both MS belong to different AS, in other words both 
are in different HLR. There are two main entities in the 
EasySMS protocol. First is the Authentication Server (AS), 
works as Authentication Center (AuC) and stores all the 
symmetric keys shared between AS and the respective MS. In 
this paper, we refer AuC as the AS. Second entity is the 
Certified Authority/ Registration Authority (CA/RA) which 
stores all the information related to the mobile subscribers. We 
assume that every subscriber has to register his/her mobile 
number with CA/RA entity and only after the verification of 
identity, the SIM card gets 
activated by this entity. Thus, 
this entity is responsible to 
validate the identity of the 
subscribers.  
We also assume that a 
symmetric key is shared 
between the AS and the 
CA/RA which provides the 
proper security to all the 
transmitted information 
between AS and CA/RA. It is 
considered that various 
authentication servers are 
connected with each other 
through a secure channel since one centralized server is not 
efficient to handle data all around. We consider all the 
transmission among various AS take place by encrypting the 
message with a symmetric key shared between each pair of 
AS. Both scenarios of this protocol are as follows: 
Scenario-1: When both MS belong to same AS: This 
scenario is presented in Fig. 2 where MS1 sends a message to 
MS2 and both MS belong to the same AS. This scenario is 
subdivided into two phases.  
Phase-1: (1) First, the mobile user who wants to send the 
SMS (say MS1) transmits an initial request to other mobile 
user (say MS2) for the connection. This initial request consists 
of International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of MS1 
(say IDMS1), a timestamp T1, a request number ReqNo and a 
message authentication code MAC1 = f1SK1(IDMS1 
||ReqNo). Here, SK1 is a symmetric key shared between the 
MS1 and the AS2. (2) On receiving the message from MS1, 
the mobile user who receives this request (say MS2) computes 
the MAC2 = f1SK2 (IDMS2||T2||MAC1). Then MS2 sends a 
message to the AS containing the IDMS1, IDMS2, T2, 
MAC1, ReqNo and MAC2 where IDMS2 is the IMSI of the 
MS2. The SK2 is a symmetric key shared between MS2 and 
the AS. 
 






With this message, the MS2 requests to the AS to check the 
validity of the IDMS1. (3) When the AS receives a message 
from the MS2, it computes the MAC2’ = 
f1SK2(IDMS2||T2||MAC1) and compares it with the received 
MAC2. If it holds then the AS sends not only the IDMS1 but 
also the IDMS2 to the CA/RA along with a timestamp T3 
using a symmetric shared key between AS and CA/RA (say 
SK_AS-CA) to validate the identity of both MS. If, MAC2 
and MAC2’ are not equal then the connection is terminated. 
(4) Next, the CA/RA checks the validity of both entities and 
sends the reply back to the AS with the received timestamp 
T3. (5) On receiving the message from the CA/RA, if the AS 
finds any of the entities is invalid then the connection is 
simply terminated and MS1 needs to send a fresh connection 
request. If both entities are valid then the AS generates a new 
timestamp T4, an expiry time to authenticate MS1 (say ExpT), 
a delegate key DK1 generated from the SK1 using a function 
f2 and a new message authentication code MAC3=f1SK1(T4|| 
ExpT||ReqNo) and DK1= f2SK1( T4||ReqNo). Then the AS 
sends (T4, MAC3, ExpT) to the MS1. (6) After receiving the 
message from AS, the MS1 first computes MAC3’ and 
compares it with the received MAC3, where MAC3’= 
f1SK1(T4||ExpT||ReqNo). If both are same then MS1 
computes the DK1. Next, MS1 sends T4 and the 
corresponding ReqNo to the AS encrypted with the DK1 key. 
(7) The AS checks the received T4 with its stored value and 
confirms ReqNo. If both are correct then the authentication of 
MS1 is completed and then after AS sends DK1 to the MS2 
along with a new timestamp T5, ExpT and ReqNo after 
encrypting all using the SK of MS2 (SK_MS2) which is a 
shared key between AS and MS2. (8) The MS2 simply 
confirms the reception of DK1 key by replying to the AS, the 
 
Fig. 3. EasySMS Scenario 2: (a) Phase-1 (b) Phase-2 
 
 







T5 encrypted with the SK of MS2. (9) MS2 also sends ReqNo 
and T1 to the MS1 encrypted with DK1 so that MS1 can 
verify the correctness of T1 and ReqNo. This message also 
verifies the successful reception of DK1 by the MS2. 
Phase-2: Once both MS have a shared secret symmetric 
key, they can exchange the message information in a secure 
manner using a suitable and strong cryptographic algorithm 
like AES/ MAES (explained later). After phase-1, a session is 
generated which provides the secure communication between 
both MS for a specified time period ExpT. In this time period 
the same DK1 key is used to provide ciphering between MS1 
and MS2 but after the ExpT time the session gets expire and 
MS1 needs to send a fresh request to MS2 with a new request 
number ReqNo with the same procedure of phase-1. Within 
the ExpT, the following steps are used for the communication 
between both MS: (1) The MS1 sends the IDMS1 and a 
timestamp (say Ti) to the MS2 encrypted with symmetric key 
of MS1 i.e., DK1. (2) MS2 decrypts the message using the 
same DK1 key and checks the validity of IDMS1 and verifies 
whether Ti <= ExpT.  If both are correct then MS1 is 
successfully authenticated and proved as a valid user for the 
connection. Then MS2 replies the same received Ti encrypted 
with DK1 as an acknowledgement to MS1. (3) Secure SMS 
communication between both MS takes place. 
Scenario-2: When both MS belong to different AS:  This 
scenario is presented in Fig. 3 where MS1 sends a message to 
MS2 while both MS belong to the different AS. This case is 
one where both mobile users are located in the geographically 
far areas and they have different authentication centers. It may 
be the case where both MS are of different service providers 
so they genuinely have different authentication centers. This 
scenario is also subdivided into two phases. 
Phase-1: (1) It is same as presented in step-1 of scenario-1. 
Here, SK1 is a symmetric key shared between MS1 and AS1. 
(2) The MS2 passes (IDMS1, IDMS2, ReqNo, T2, MAC1, 
MAC2) to the AS through which it is connected (say AS2). 
The SK2 is a symmetric key shared between MS2 and the 
AS2. With this message, the MS2 requests to the AS2 to check 
the validity of the IDMS1. The MS2 stores the timestamp T1 
in the memory which was received from the MS1. (3) The 
AS2 computes the same as presented in step-3 of scenario-1 
and checks whether MAC2?=MAC2’. (4) The CA/RA checks 
the validity of both entities and sends the reply back to the 
AS2 with the received timestamp T3 and the identity of AS to 
which MS1 belongs (say AS1). (5) The AS2 checks the same 
as in scenario-1 step-5, if both entities are valid then the AS2 
sends (IDMS1, ReqNo, MAC1) to the AS1 through a secure 
channel or using a symmetric key shared between AS1 and 
AS2 (say SK_AS1-AS2). We assume that all AS communicate 
with each other using the pre-computed symmetric shard keys. 
(6) When the AS1 receives the message from the AS2, it 
computes MAC1’= f1SK1(IDMS1||ReqNo) and compares 
MAC1’ with the received MAC1. If both are different then the 
connection is terminated. If both are same then the AS1 
generates a new timestamp T4, an expiry time to authenticate 
MS1 (say ExpT), a delegate key DK1 generated from the SK1 
of MS1 using a function f2, and a MAC3, where MAC3 = 
f1SK1(T4||ExpT|| ReqNo) and DK1 = f2SK1(T4|| ReqNo). 
Then the AS1 sends (T4, MAC3, ExpT) to the MS1. (7) After 
receiving the message from AS1, MS1 repeats the same as in 
scenario-1 step-6 and sends (T4, ReqNo) to the AS1 encrypted 
with DK1 key. (8) The AS1 checks T4 and ReqNo as in 
scenario-1 step-7. Then AS1 conveys the confirmation of the 
authentication of MS1 by sending a message (ReqNo, ExpT, 
DK1) to the AS2 using SK_AS1-AS2 key. (9) The AS2 sends  
DK1 to the MS2 along with a new timestamp T5, expiry time 
ExpT and request number ReqNo after encrypting all using the 
SK of MS2 (say SK_MS2) which is a shared key between the 
AS2 and the MS2. (10) MS2 repeats the same as in scenario-1 
step-8, and sends encrypted reply of T5 to the AS2. (11) It is 
same as in scenario-1 step-9.  
Phase-2: The phase-2 is same as discussed in the previous 
scenario of phase-2. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
This section analyzes proposed protocol in various aspects 
such as mutual authentication, prevention from various threats 
and attacks, key management, and computation & 
communication overheads. 
Is the Secret Key SK Safely Stored? Since any malicious 
user does not know the structure of cryptographic functions 
like f1() and f2(), so he/she can neither generate the correct 
MAC1 nor correct delegation key DK1. The secret key SK is 
stored in the authentication server/center as well as embedded 
onto the SIM at the time of manufacturing. Thus, it is almost 
impossible to extract the SK. The storage scenario of SK key 
we presented is same as nowadays used for the voice 
communication in the traditional cellular networks. If some 
service providers do not wish to use actual SK in the protocol 
execution, they can compute alternate secret keys with a new 
function f’’ as: SK1’ =f’’SK1(IDMS1) and SK2’= 
f’’SK2(IDMS2). We do not prefer to do it because it increases 
the overall overhead of protocol. 
Is There Any Alternative for IMSI? Since a malicious user 
with only known IMSI (by some IMSI catcher but functions 
and secret keys are still unknown) cannot break the security of 
proposed protocol. Thus, the proposed protocol is secure. We 
can also have one alternate for it. We can propose a new 
function f’() which computes a temporary IMSI for each MS 
whenever it wants to communicate. At MS: compute IDMS1 = 
f’(IMSI1, MAC1); At AS: compute IMSI1 = f’(IDMS1, 
MAC1). This is simply possible by XORing the IMSI1 (or 
IDMS1) and MAC1 (twice), because the size of MAC1 is 64 
bits while IMSI1/IDMS1 is of 128 bits. The function f’() 
should be known to MS as well as AS but publically 
unknown. But we recommend using a complex function to 
compute the same. However, we do not prefer because it 
increases the overhead at MS as well as at AS. 
A. Mutual Authentication between MS and AS 
In scenario-1 of EasySMS protocol, the AS authenticates 
MS1 by verifying the MAC2 and checks the identity of MS1 
through CA/RA. When AS receives MAC2, it simply 
calculates MAC2’ and compares it with the received MAC2. 








Similarly, on receiving MAC3, the MS1 computes MAC3’ to 
authenticate the AS. If MAC3 is equal to the MAC3’ then the 
authentication of AS is successful. This all ensures the mutual 
authentication between MS1 and AS through MS2. Similarly, 
in scenario-2, the AS1 authenticates MS1 through AS2 and 
MS2. The integrity is maintained between MS1-AS1 and 
MS2-AS2 by comparing the MAC1-MAC1’ and MAC2-
MAC2’ respectively. The MS1 authenticates AS1 by 
comparing MAC3 with MAC3’. 
B. Efficient Key Management  
The EasySMS protocol is able to efficiently handle the key 
management issue in both scenarios where the DK1 key (from 
the symmetric key of MS1) is securely transmitted by the AS 
to the MS2 (scenario-1) or by the AS2 to the MS2 through 
AS1 (scenario-2). Thus, this protocol successfully ciphers the 
message before its transmission over the network. We 
preferred a symmetric key algorithm because these algorithms 
are 1000 times faster than the asymmetric algorithms [24] and 
improve the efficiency of the system. 
C. Resistance to Attacks 
In this subsection, we justify that the EasySMS protocol is 
able to prevent the transmitted SMS from various attacks over 
the network. It is assumed that the cryptographic functions 
used in the paper are not publically available and are secret. 
The capturing of any secret key SK is not possible because no 
secret key has been transmitted in any phase of the proposed 
protocol and always a delegation key DK1 is being transferred 
in cipher form whenever is required. Secret keys are also not 
publically available and are secret. 
1) SMS Disclosure: In EasySMS protocol, a cryptographic 
encryption algorithm AES/MAES is maintained to provide 
end-to-end confidentiality to the transmitted SMS in the 
network. Thus, encryption approach prevents the transmitted 
SMS from SMS disclosure.  
2) Replay Attack: The proposed protocol is free from this 
attack because it sends one timestamp (like T1, T2, T3, T4 and 
T5) with each message during the communication over the 
network. These unique timestamp values prevent the system 
from the replay attack. This attack can be detected if later 
previous information is used or modified. 
3) Man-in-the-Middle Attack: In EasySMS protocol, a 
symmetric algorithm AES/MAES is used for encrypting/ 
decrypting end-to-end communication between the MS and 
the AS in both scenarios. The message is end-to-end securely 
encrypted/decrypted with DK1 key for every subsequent 
authentication and since attacker does not have sufficient 
information to generate DK1, thus it prevents the 
communication from MITM attack over the network.  
4)  OTA Modification in SMS Transmission: The EasySMS 
protocol provides end-to-end security to the SMS from the 
sender to the receiver including OTA interface with an 
additional strong encryption algorithm AES/MAES. The 
protocol does not depend upon the cryptographic security of 
encryption algorithm (such as A5/1, A5/2) exists between MS 
and BTS in traditional cellular networks. This protocol 
provides end-to-end security to end users. It protects the 
message content being access by mobile operators as well as 
from attackers present in the transmitted medium. 
5) Impersonation Attack: There are two cases to evaluate this 
attack with EasySMS protocol. Both cases are as follows: (a) 
When an attacker impersonates the MS: In EasySMS protocol, 
if an attacker tries to impersonate the MS, he/she will not get 
success because in scenario-1, the AS calculates the MAC2’ 
and compares it with the received MAC2 while in scenario-2, 
the AS2 computes MAC2’ and compares with MAC2 and 
after that AS1 computes MAC1’ and checks whether MAC1’ 
is equal to the MAC1. Thus, at any stage if the AS finds the 
above comparison false then the connection is simply 
terminated. (b) When an attacker impersonates the AS: If an 
attacker tries to impersonate the AS (or AS1/AS2), the attempt 
to impersonate the AS will be failed as the MS1 computes 
MAC3’ and compares it with the received MAC3. Thus, an 
attempt to impersonate the AS terminates the connection. 
D. Computation Overhead 
We have considered all the security functions used in 
EasySMS, SMSSec, and PK-SIM a unit value. On the basis of 
authentication requests ‘n’ and number of functions used in 
three protocols, we calculate computation overhead as: 
1) SMSSec Protocol: Phase-1: [H, {}PK, {}SK, {}SK, {}SK] 
= 5; Phase-2: [H, HU, {}SK, {}SK_n, {}SK_n, {}SK_n]*n = 
6*n; Total Overhead = 5+6*n 
2) PK-SIM Protocol: Phase-1: [H(CertSAG), {}SK_SAG, 
H(C_ME), {}SK_SAG, H(Ns, Nc, UAKey, Expiry), 
{}SK_SAG, {}PK_PK-SIM, {}E_UAKey]=8; Phase-2: 
[MAC, {}E_SK, MAC’, {}E_SK]*n = 4*n; Total  = 8+4*n 
3) EasySMS Protocol: Scenario-1: Phase-1: f1, f1, f1, f1, f1, 
f2, f2, {}SK_AS-CA, {}SK_AS-CA, {}SK_MS2, 
{}SK_MS2, {}DK1, {}DK1 = 13; Phase-2: [{}DK1, 
{}DK1]*n = 2*n;  Total Computation Overhead = 13+2*n 
TABLE IV 




10 0.55 0.75 
50 0.38 0.55 
100 0.35 0. 
200 0.34 0.62 
500 0.33 0.61 
1000 0.33                                       0.6                                  
Average 0.38                                       0.69 
   
 
TABLE III 




10 0.76 0.99 
50 0.48 0.69 
100 0.45 0.64 
200 0.43 0.62 
500 0.42 0.61 
1000 0.41                                       0.6                                  
Average 0.49                                       0.69 







Scenario-2: Phase-1: f1, f1, f1, f1, f1, f1, f2, f2, {}SK_AS-
CA, {}SK_AS-CA, {}SK_AS1-AS2, {}SK_AS1-AS2, 
{}SK_MS2, {}SK_MS2, {}DK1, {}DK1 = 16; Phase-2: 
[{}DK1, {}DK1]*n = 2*n; Total Overhead = 16+2*n 
E. Communication Overhead 
In this subsection, we calculate the transmitted message size 
to evaluate communication overhead in EasySMS, SMSSec, 
and PK-SIM protocols. The total number of transmitted bits 
can be calculated with the help of the size specified in Table I. 
Total number of transmitted bits in each protocol is as:  
1) SMSSec Protocol: Phase-1: (1)+(2)+(3)+(4) = (40+64+64 
+28+128)+(128+16+28)+(28)+(28) = 552 bits; Phase-2: (for n 
values) = ((1)+(2)+(3)+(4))*n = ((64+40+64+64+28+128)  
+(128+16+28)+(28)+(28))*n = 616*n; Total bits = 552 + 
616*n; Here, random number Rc is 128 bits.  
2) PK-SIM Protocol: Phase-1:(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)+(5)=(40+128 
+64+28)+(40)+(40+64)+(128+128+64+64)+(128) = 916 bits; 
Phase-2: (for n values) = ((1)+(2))*n = ((40+128+64)+(128 + 
64))*n = 424*n; Total transmitted bits = 916 + 424*n 
3) EasySMS Protocol: Case-1: Phase-1: (1)+(2)+ (3)+(4)+ 
(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)+(9)=(128+64+64+8)+(128+128+64+64+64+ 
8)+(128+128+64)+(64)+(64+64+64)+(64+8)+(64+8+64+256) 
+(64)+(64+8) = 1896 bits; Phase-2: ((1)+(2))*n = ((64+ 
128)+(64))*n = 256*n bits; Total bits = 1896 + 256*n bits 




(64)+(8+64)=2552 bits; Phase-2: ((1))+(2))*n = ((64+ 
128)+(64)*n= 256*n bits; Total bits = 2552 + 256*n 
Fig. 4 shows the graphs between the number of bits and the 
number of authentication requests generated. It can be clearly 
seen that EasySMS generates lesser computation overhead 
(Fig. 4(a)) and communication overhead (Fig. 4(b)) as 
compare to SMSSec and PK-SIM protocols. 
 
F. Bandwidth Utilization 
This subsection evaluates the bandwidth utilized by all three 
protocols and compares them with respect to each other. Table 
III presents the bandwidth utilization of EasySMS with respect 
to SMSSec and PK-SIM protocols. It can be easily concluded 
that on an average, the EasySMS protocol reduces 51% and 
31% of the bandwidth consumption during the authentication 
process as compare to SMSSec and PK-SIM respectively, 
while the number of authentication requests is considered as 
10, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000. Similarly, Table IV shows that 
proposed protocol reduces 62% and 45% of the message 
exchanged in comparison both protocols respectively. 
V. SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM 
In this section, we focus on the selection criteria to choose a 
block cipher based symmetric key algorithm. The performance 
of a block cipher varies with the block size and key size. 
Larger the block size, faster will be the algorithm, because 
with a larger block size, a large chunk of the data will be 
encrypted in a single execution cycle of the algorithm. 
TABLE V 








PCBC 160, 80 160, 155 160, 155 160, 80 
ECB 160, 143 160, 160 160, 168 160, 80 
CBC 160, 80 160, 156 160, 156 160, 155 
CTR 160, 82 160, 82 160, 82 160, 160 
CFB 160, 82 160, 82 160, 159 160, 161 
OFB 160, 161           160, 82 160, 82           160, 82 
     
 
 
Fig. 5. Encryption and Decryption with different size of messages 
  
 







Likewise, a larger key results in a slower algorithm, because 
in general, all bits of the key are involved in an execution 
cycle of the algorithm. A large number of rounds make the 
algorithm slower but are supposed to provide greater security 
[25]. Thus, there is always a trade-off between security and 
performance in block cipher algorithms [26]. Eli Biham [27] 
has suggested that performance of algorithm should be 
measured by timing the minimum number of secure rounds for 
each algorithm, i.e., the estimated number of rounds needed to 
make a brute force key search which is the most efficient form 
of attack but there is no easy way of obtaining impartial and 
widely accepted values for the minimum number of secure 
rounds for each algorithm. In J2ME, the WMA (Wireless 
Messaging API) [28] provides tools for sending and receiving 
SMS messages. Our solution is based on JDK 1.6 and is 
simulated with Java MIDlet, which is an application written in 
Java for the Micro Edition platform. The application can send 
and receive SMS messages in binary format using the WMA. 
Since the J2ME does not contain cryptographic algorithms, we 
used Lightweight API from the Legion of the Bouncy Castle. 
A. Simulation 
Some existing symmetric key algorithms like DES, Triple-
DES with 2-keys, Triple-DES with 3-keys, and AES have 
been implemented. The results have generated on a PC with 
configuration of Core i3 processor, 4 GB RAM, 320 GB HD 
and Windows7 OS. J2ME implementation of these algorithms 
is limited with 160 characters only, i.e., single SMS. We have 
used JDK 1.6 for the implementation of these algorithms with 
more than 160 characters. The standard key size used in DES, 
Triple DES with 2-keys, Triple-DES with 3-keys and AES are 
64 (out of which 56 bits are used), 112, 168, and 128 bits 
respectively. Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) show the results observed 
through JDK1.6 for encryption and decryption with DES, 
Triple-DES with 2-keys, Triple-DES with 3-keys, and AES. 
The results conclude that out of these algorithms, AES takes 
minimum time to encrypt and decrypt the SMS with various 
sizes where one SMS size is 160 characters. Table V 
represents the pairs of plain text and cipher text with respect to 
various algorithms DES, AES, Triple-DES with 2-keys, and 
Triple-DES with 3-keys implemented in various modes of 
operations like Propagation Chain Block Cipher (PCBC), 
Electronic Code Book (ECB), Chain Block Cipher (CBC), 
Counter (CTR), Output Feedback Block (OFB) and Cipher 
Feedback Block (CFB). Out of all these modes, CTR mode is 
the most popular and usable, because it provides the 
parallelism to encrypt and decrypt all blocks of data 
simultaneously. Nowadays, DES and Triple-DES algorithms 
are not considered as very secure algorithms [29], [30] since 
previously some attacks have been found on both algorithms. 
Thus, AES is the best option for this purpose which is 
considered one of the best secure algorithms.  With the input 
of 160 characters, DES, AES, Triple-DES with 2-keys, and 
Triple-DES with 3-keys algorithms in CTR mode generate 82, 
82, 82 and 160 characters cipher respectively, which means 
through AES, we can still send 160 characters after encrypting 
the SMS.  Each algorithm results are calculated 30 times by 
repeating execution and the average value is considered. 
B. Reliability Analysis with Confidence Interval 
We have also calculated the range of confidence interval, 
considering it 95% for each algorithm with 160 characters as 
input because the reported margin of error is typically about 
twice the standard deviation – the radius of a 95% confidence 
interval [31]. Confidence interval is an interval estimate of a 
population parameter and is used to indicate the reliability of 
an estimate. Fig. 6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(d) and 6(e) represent the 
range of confidence interval (high & low range values) for 
both encryption (E_low_interval, E_high_interval) and 
decryption (D_low_interval, D_high_interval) of the message 
(SMS) for 160, 320, 480, 640 and 800 characters in length for 
DES, Triple-DES with 2-keys, Triple-DES with 3-keys and 
 






AES algorithms where all times are in nanoseconds. We have 
used t-distribution to calculate the confidence interval because 
it computes confidence intervals for large ‘n’ if the data is not 
normally distributed, i.e., for large ‘n’ the sample mean 
converges in distribution to a normal distribution and for large  
 
degrees of freedom the t-distribution converges to a normal 
distribution [32]. In this process, the SMS size from 160 to 
800 characters is evaluated where more than 160 characters in 
an SMS is split and concatenated with another SMS. Thus, 
transmitted message can contain a range of 1120 to 56000 bits 
where each character is mapped with 7-bit ASCII value. A low 
standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be 
very close to the mean, whereas high standard deviation 
indicates that the data points are spread out over a large range 
of values. Since, the AES algorithm is strict to its output 
range, thus, it is best among them. 
C. A Variant of AES: MAES Algorithm 
AES with 128-bit key has proved to be an efficient 
algorithm to encrypt the SMS but its security cannot be remain 
maintained in the subsequent years. Various researchers have 
found attacks on AES with 128-bit key [33], [34] with some 
assumptions. Thus, we propose a variant of AES called MAES 
(modified AES) which is more secure with 256-bit key (as 
original AES) and 256-bit each block of data. The increase in 
length of each block improves the performance of original 
AES. Various steps of the MAES algorithm are as follows: 
(1) Key Generation: In EasySMS protocol, 256-bit of DK1 
key is generated at the MS1 and AS which is used as cipher 
key for MAES and round keys are derived from this 256 bits 
cipher key using AES key schedule. (2) Initial Round: 
AddRoundKey—each byte of the state is combined with the 
round key using bitwise XOR. (3) Rounds: (i) SubBytes—a 
non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced with 
another according to a lookup table, (ii) ShiftRows—a 
transposition step where each row of the state is shifted 
cyclically a certain number of steps, (iii) MixColumns—a 
mixing operation which operates on the columns of the state, 
(iv) AddRoundKey. (4) Final Round (no MixColumns): (i) 
SubBytes (ii) ShiftRows (iii) AddRoundKey 
On considering the best assembly code combinations and 
continuance memory usage, the order of SubByte and 
ShiftRow processes are swapped, to reduce the number of 
times in memory reads and writes, as well as increase the 
computation speed without compromising the actual result 
[35], and this is done with MAES algorithm. Next, in AES, the 
MixColumns step is defined as a multiplication of columns 
with the matrix M. The matrix M used in the AES and its 
inverse matrix 1−M , both are different and the calculation of 
inverse of a matrix increases the computation. Thus, we used 





















Table VI shows the performance of AES and MAES 
algorithms with one SMS size of plain text and cipher text 
pairs in bits and characters, where MAES generates 158 
characters after ciphering the SMS of 160 characters. We have 
implemented various algorithms DES, Triple-DES, AES, 
CAST6, Twofish, RC2, RC6, MAES and performed the 
encryption/decryption of SMS with 160 characters which are 
shown in Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d). Finally, we conclude that out 
of these algorithms, the MAES algorithm is more efficient to 
encrypt the SMS. The confidence interval for AES and MAES 
can be observed from Fig. 6(f) where confidence interval 
(high & low range values) of the MAES is strictly close to the 
encryption process. 
VI. FORMAL PROOF OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
In order to clear statement of our analysis, we use the BAN-
Logic symbols to formally proof the authentication process of 
the proposed protocol. (1) XP | : P believes X, or P would 
be entitled to believe X, (2) XP  : P sees X. Someone has 
sent a message containing X to P, who can read and repeat X, 
(3) XP |~ : P once said X. P at some time sent a message 
including the statement X, (4) XP | : P has jurisdiction 
over X. P is an authority on X and should be trusted on this 
matter, (5) )(# X : The formula X is fresh, that is, X has not 
been sent in a message at any time before the current run of 
the protocol, (6) QP
K : P and Q may use the shared key K 
to communicate, (7) QP
X : The formula X is a secret known 
only to P and Q, (8) 
yX )( : This represents X combined with 
the formula Y that Y be a secret. 
1) The formal messages in SAKA protocols: Phase-1: (1): 
qNoTaIDMSMS Re,,: 121 → , ReqNo)||(IDf 1SK1 1 ; 11
1
ASMS
SK ; (2): 
qNoTbIDIDASMS Re,,,: 2122 → , ReqNo)||(IDf 1SK1 1 , 




SK ; (3): 
CAASSK




− ; (4): 
CAASSK
TcASASRACA −→ },{:/ 12 ;  (5): 
211




jASiAS  − , ; (6): 
TABLE VI 
SMS SIZE (INPUT, OUTPUT) 
One SMS Size AES 
 
MAES 
In Bits 1120, 1540 1120, 1111 
In Characters 160, 220 160, 158 













ReqNo},{: TdASMS → ; 11 1 ASMS
DK ; (8): 
2AS-1AS1
SKSK221 ReqNo)}||(Tdf,,{Re: ExptimeqNoASAS →  (9): 
,,Re,{:22 ExptimeqNoTeMSAS →
22AS-1AS1








}Re,{: qNoTaMSMS →  
Phase-2: (1): 
1DK121
},{: IDTMSMS i→ ;  
(2): 
1DK12
}{: iTMSMS →  
2) Security Assumptions: (a). It is assumed that SK is a secure 
key which is shared between MS and AS. (1) MS has SK key 
and 
SK
ASMSMS | , (2) AS has SK key and SKASMSAS | ; 




− /|/ and ASCASK ASRACAAS − /| ; (c). 
It is assumed that communication between all AS are done 





− and ,| 21 ASASSK ijj ASASAS − , where ji  . 
3) Security Analysis: Phase-1: (1): 





SK ; (2): 
qNoTbIDIDASTbASTbMSASMS Re,,,);(#|)(#|: 2122222 →




; (3): On receiving, the 2AS  calculates
ReqNo))||(IDf ||Tb||(IDf 1SK12SK1 12 , if it matches then 
CAASSK




− , (4): After 
receiving the message from 
2AS the CA/RA validate 1ID and 
2ID and then CAASSKTcASASRACA −→ },{:/ 12 ;  (5):
211




jASiAS  − , ; (6): First 1AS computes 







1MS computes ReqNo)||Exptime||(Tdf 1SK1  
and 
compares it with the received one, then 
1DK11
ReqNo},{: TdASMS → ; 11 1 ASMS DK ; (8): 1AS  checks 
ReqNo and #Td then
2AS-1AS1
SKSK221 ReqNo)}||(Tdf,,{Re: ExptimeqNoASAS → ; (9): 
22AS-1AS1




}{: TeASMS → and checks #Te with the received 
#Te; (11): 
1DK12
}Re,{: qNoTaMSMS → , if 1MS finds correct 
#Ta and ReqNo then the authentication is successful.  
Phase-2: (1): 
1DK121
},{: IDTMSMS i→ ; On receiving the 
message the 
2MS  checks validity of 1ID  and ExptimeTi  . 
(2): 
1DK12
}{: iTMSMS → ; If received iT  is same as was sent 
then authentication is completed. 
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7) Protocol Goals: (a) Mutual Authentication between the MS 
and the AS: 
11122 || MSMSASASMS →  
122 ||| ASASMS  , thus mutual authentication is hold.  
(b) Efficient Key Management between sender and receiver 
MS: There is one key 
1DK  between the MS and the AS to 




)(#|),(#| 222 TeSKMSTeAS  , and 
12221 |~)()( DKMSASASAS →→ , (c) Key Freshness 
between the MS and the AS:
),(#|)(#|),(#|)(#| 2211 TeMSTeASTdMSTdAS 
ReqNo)||(Tdf
1SK21

























   
(e) Resistance Replay Attack: If the attacker gets #Ta from 
message (1) and #Tb from message (2), he/she is unable to 
forge the message because he/she doesn’t know
1SK  and 2SK . 
If the attacker gets #Td from message (6) and #Te from 
message (9), he/she is unable to forge the message because 
he/she doesn’t know
1DK  and 2SK . Since #Ta, #Tb, #Td and 
#Te will be changed next time thus it resistance the attack. (f) 
Resistance Man-in-the-Middle Attack: Since attacker neither 
knows 
1DK  nor 1{}DK  encryption algorithm, thus it prevents 
the communication from being eavesdropped. (g) Resistance 
SMS Disclosure and OTA Attack: The MAES algorithm is 
proposed to use as 
1
{}DK which prevents SMS disclosure 
attack. End-to-end security of message OTA between both MS 
is provided by MAES with 
1DK . 
h. Resistance Impersonation Attack: (1) Adversary tries to 
impersonate MS: Since ReqNo))||(IDf ||Tb||(IDf 1SK12SK1 12  
and ReqNo)||(IDf 1SK1 1  are computed at 2MS  and 1MS , and 
compared at 
2AS  and 1AS  respectively. This prevents the MS 
from the impersonation attack. (2) Adversary tries to 
impersonate AS: The integrity value 
ReqNo))||(IDf ||Tb||(IDf 1SK12SK1 12  
at 
2MS  and the 2AS  will 
be violated. Additionally, if the 
1MS  receives 
ReqNo)||Exptime||(Tdf
1SK1
at any time, then the connection 
will be terminated because 
1MS  has not sent any request.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
EasySMS protocol is successfully designed in order to 
provide end-to-end secure communication through SMS 
between mobile users. The analysis of the proposed protocol 
shows that the protocol is able to prevent various attacks. The 
transmission of symmetric key to the mobile users is 
efficiently managed by the protocol. This protocol produces 
lesser communication and computation overheads, utilizes 
bandwidth efficiently, and reduces message exchanged during 
authentication than SMSSec and PK-SIM protocols.  
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